CAP on GAZA

[phishtaper]

check out the avatar, He's thinking sand dune dance party.

well, maybe that's not a bad idea.

what can we do here in Canada that can help bring together the people affected by these conflicts in a non-aggressive way?

perhaps org's like B'Nai Brith Canada and the Canadian Arab Federation could co-sponsor a few beach parties in the area that might actually help to relieve some of the tension and begin to build positive relationships among people.

[Thorgnor]

check out the avatar' date=' He's thinking sand dune dance party.[/quote']

well, maybe that's not a bad idea.

Your welcome

There's an organization at York U that is aimed at getting all three groups (Muslims/Arabs, Jews/Isreali supporters & "Outside"/Christian voices) to get together and literally do stuff like this. They also show up where the two opposing sides are fighting (usually in the hallways between classrooms) and try to calm the situation. It's a pretty ballsy initiative to take when there's violence going on right there in front of you. The school's good at keeping that stuff sort of quiet...

[SaggyBalls]

A 'Holy Land for Everyone' group?

Awesome.

[Thorgnor]

Shalom - Salaam

[SaggyBalls]

"perhaps org's like B'Nai Brith Canada and the Canadian Arab Federation could co-sponsor a few beach parties in the area that might actually help to relieve some of the tension and begin to build positive relationships among people. "

it would take OTHER groups to do that for there to be complete trust in motives...but that's an awesome idea.

[Big Wooly Mammoth]

'Who Has Won Here?'

By Ulrike Putz in Beit Lahia, Gaza

In the Gaza Strip people are returning home -- or to the rubble that was once their home. Many are blaming Hamas for the destruction because the militants hid among civilians and attracted Israeli fire. Yet no one dares to speak out openly.

What is left over when a person is hit by a tank shell. Blood, tissue, bone splinters, splatters on the wall.

And anger.

Mohammed Sadala's rage is aimed at the man, whose remains he found in his bedroom: a Hamas fighter. He and a comrade broke into the home which had long stood empty after the Sadala family fled. The Hamas men shot at the approaching Israelis from the balcony. The soldiers fired back, killing the militants and destroying the house of the 10-strong family in the process.

When Sadala came back to survey the scene he found his property in ruins: the younger children's bedroom was burnt out, while the living room and hallway were strewn with bullet holes and blackened by soot from the fire. In the bedroom lay the corpses: one had bled to death, the other was hit by a tank shell.

Beside the bodies lay the assault rifle which they had used to try to stop the tanks.

"I used to support Hamas because they fought for our country, for Palestine," says Sadala. Hamas stood for a new start, for an end of corruption, which had spread like cancer under the moderate Fatah. In the 2006 elections Hamas won the majority with their message of change, said Sadala, who earned a living in the building business. Gesticulating wildly, the 52-year-old surveyed the ruins of the bedroom: "That is the change that they brought about. We were blasted back 2,000 years."

Through the hole in the wall of his house, Sadala sees a landscape in gray and brown. This is where a neighbourhood had stood, his neighbourhood. Now there is a snake of sand around the bomb crater. It is impossible to tell where the streets once stood. Family houses have turned into piles of debris. People have built refuges using cloth and rubble. They stand alongside dead donkeys and sheep, whose stomachs swell up. No one here has time to remove rotting corpses.

The people from Beit Lahia are starting from zero again: children load wood from broken trees onto their back. Their mothers bend over fires and bake bread. Young women carry water in petrol canisters. Only the men stand around looking numb, smoking, staring blankly. Many people here, like Sandala, had placed their hopes in Hamas -- now they are gazing into nothing, ideologically as well as materially.

Everything Is Lost Now

And it is not just buildings that lie in rubble in the Gaza strip, it is the livelihoods of many thousands of people. In Arabic societies a home is usually everything a family possesses. Often several brothers build a house for the entire family. Living at close quarters has its advantages: when the costs of building the house are paid off, there is more money left over to feed the dozens of family members.

Everything is lost now.

"When Hamas came to power, they came to our aid with packages of groceries," says Abu Abed. The 60-year-old's sons, all of whom are trained hospital nurses, have been without work for years. That is true of many in the Gaza Strip. Now Abu Abed stands before the rumble of the house where he lived with four generations of his family. All that remains are the ground floor pillars. The Israeli navy had its eye on the building from the very beginning of the war. After all, its clear view of Gaza City and the sea would have provided a good base for Hamas.

"I've changed my mind about Hamas," Abu Abed says. "I can't support any party that wages a war that destroys our lives." He is particularly pained by the fact that Hamas is still selling the cease-fire as a victory.

"Who has won here?" he asks and points to the debris that was once his home.

One of his neighbors weighs in: "Many people are now against Hamas but that won't change anything," he says. "Because anyone who stands up to them is killed." Since they took power Hamas has used brutal force against any dissenters in the Gaza Strip. There were news agency reports that during the war they allegedly executed suspected collaborators with Israel. The reign of terror will go on for some time, says the neighbor who doesn't want to give his name. "There will never be a rebellion against Hamas. It would be suicide."

Others swallow their anger. Hail's house is just a few streets away and only suffered light damage. There are a few bullet holes in the living room walls and all of the window panes are broken. Hail also found out after the cease-fire that the militants had used his house as a base for their operations. The door to his house stood open and there were electric cables lying in the hallway. When Hail followed them they led to his neighbor's house which it seems Hamas had mined.

As Hail, in his mid-30s, sat on his porch and thought about what to do a man came by: He was from Hamas and had left something in Hail's home. He let him in and the man then emerged with a bullet proof vest, a rocket launcher and an ammunitions belt. An hour later a fighter with Islamic Jihad called to the door, then disappeared onto the roof and reappeared with a box of ammunition. "The abused civilians' homes for their own purposes. That is not right," Hail says with disgust while trying to remain polite.

In contrast to many of their neighbors the Sadala family is doing comparatively well. They have all survived and the house could theoretically still be repaired. Mohammed Sadala is of another opinion: "There is no way," he says. What happened in his bedroom cannot be covered up just by cleaning. The worst is that he now knows who died in the room. It was Bilal Haj Ali. Sadala knows this because the young mans brothers came to visit a few days ago. They wanted to see the place where Bilal became a martyr. "I did let them in but I hardly spoke a word with them," he says.

The young men took photos of the remains of their brother with their mobile phones. "But they didn't want to clean it up," Sadala says. "I told them not to show their faces here ever again."

URL:

* http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,603203,00.html

[SaggyBalls]

Hamas is a Jihadist group - which is really the spiritual struggle of Islam.

I would've probably not reacted as well to people in my home taking photos of their dead brother and doing nothing to take him with them as Mohammad Sadala did.

It's not that Palestine's been blasted back 2000 years, but it's more that Israel is the side more easily supported after Hamas strike out so mindlessly.

[Thorgnor]

Hamas is a Jihadist group - which is really the spiritual struggle of Islam.

For simple clarification, are you saying that Hamas should be fighting Isreal becasue that's what Jihad is about, or that they've taken the tradition and language of a religion and made it a tool for the legitimization of their continued violence against the state of Isreal?

As I understand it Jihad is the struggle against one's own base and unsactified actions of instinct and desire. To be truly Muslim is to wage a "holy war" against that which splinters your relationship with the divine. The use of the term Jihad for the legitimization of rocket launchers is a rationalization of Hamas' political ambitions, a reach for rulership, not divinity. If we accept their use of this term, we might as well call the molestation of children by Priests a form of communion.

[SaggyBalls]

Struggle for struggle itself.

Your comparison would have more weight if the alter boys were wafer thin. Whiney maybe.

[Thorgnor]

From the Encyclopoaedia of Islam.

ḎJ̲ihÄd

etymologically signifies an effort directed towards a determined objective. (Cf. id̲j̲tihÄd : the work of the scholar-jurists in seeking the solution of legal problems; mud̲j̲Ähada or, again, d̲j̲ihÄd: an effort directed upon oneself for the attainment of moral and religious perfection. Certain writers, particularly among those of S̲h̲īʿite persuasion, qualify this d̲j̲ihÄd as “spiritual d̲j̲ihÄd†and as “the greater d̲j̲ihÄdâ€, in opposition to the d̲j̲ihÄd which is our present concern and which is called “physical d̲j̲ihÄd†or “the lesser d̲j̲ihÄdâ€. It is, however, very much more usual for the term d̲j̲ihÄd to denote this latter form of “effortâ€).

In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, the d̲j̲ihÄd consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence.

The notion stems from the fundamental principle of the universality of Islam: this religion, along with the temporal power which it implies, ought to embrace to whole universe, if necessary by force. The principle, however, must be partially combined with another which tolerates the existence, within the Islamic community itself, of the adherents of “the religions with holy booksâ€, i.e., Christians, Jews and Mad̲j̲ūs [q.v.]. As far as these latter are concerned the d̲j̲ihÄd ceases as soon as they agree to submit to the political authority of Islam and to pay the poll tax ( d̲j̲izya [q.v.]) and the land tax ( k̲h̲arÄd̲j̲ [q.v.]). As long as the question could still, in fact, be posed, a controversy existed—generally resolved by a negative answer—on the question as to whether the Christians and Jews of the Arabian peninsula were entitled to such treatment as of right. To the non-scriptuaries, in particular the idolaters, this half measure has no application according to the opinion of the majority: their conversion to Islam is obligatory under pain of being put to death or reduced into slavery.

In principle, the d̲j̲ihÄd is the one form of war which is permissible in Islam, for, in theory, Islam must constitute a single community organized under¶ a single authority and any armed conflict between Muslims is prohibited.

Following, however, the disintegration of Muslim unity and the appearance, beginning in the middle of the 2nd/8th century, of an ever increasing number of independent States, the question arose as to how the wars which sprang up between them were to be classified. They were never included within the strict notion of d̲j̲ihÄd—even in the case of wars between states of different religious persuasion—at least according to the general SunnÄ« doctrine; and it is only by an abuse of language that this term is sometimes applied to them, while those authors who seek for a precise terminology label them only as ḳitÄl or muḳÄtala (conflict, war). There is even hesitation in referring to the struggle against the renegade groups in Islam as d̲j̲ihÄd. The viewpoint of S̲h̲īʿite doctrine is not the same, for, according to the S̲h̲īʿa, a refusal to subscribe to their teaching is equivalent to unbelief (kufr). The same holds good, a fortiori, for the Ḵh̲Ärid̲j̲ite doctrine [see further takfÄ«r ].

The d̲j̲ihÄd is a duty. This precept is laid down in all the sources. It is true that there are to be found in the ḲurʾÄn divergent, and even contradictory, texts. These are classified by the doctrine, apart from certain variations of detail, into four successive categories: those which enjoin pardon for offences and encourage the invitation to Islam by peaceful persuasion; those which enjoin fighting to ward off aggression; those which enjoin the initiative in attack, provided it is not within the four sacred months; and those which enjoin the initiative in attack absolutely, at all times and in all places. In sum, these differences correspond to the stages in the development of Muḥammad's thought and to the modifications of policy resulting from particular circumstances; the Meccan period during which Muḥammad, in general, confines himself to moral and religious teaching, and the Medina period when, having become the leader of a politico-religious community, he is able to undertake, spontaneously, the struggle against those who do not wish to join this community or submit to his authority. The doctrine holds that the later texts abrogate the former contradictory texts (the theory of nask̲h̲ [q.v.]), to such effect that only those of the last category remain indubitably valid; and, accordingly, the rule on the subject may be formulated in these absolute terms: “the fight ( d̲j̲ihÄd) is obligatory even when they (the unbelievers) have not themselves started itâ€.

In two isolated opinions, however, attempts were made to temper the rule in some respects. According to one of these views, attributed to Ê¿Aá¹­Ä (d. 114/732-3), the ancient prohibition against fighting during the sacred months remains valid; while according to the other, attributed to SufyÄn al-T̲h̲awrÄ« (born 97/715), the d̲j̲ihÄd is obligatory only in defence; it is simply recommended (li 'l-nadb) in attack. According to a view held by modern orientalist scholarship, Muḥammad's conception of the d̲j̲ihÄd as attack applied only in relation to the peoples of Arabia; its general application was the result of the id̲j̲mÄÊ¿ (general consensus of opinion) of the immediately succeeding generations. At root, of course, this involves the problem as to whether Muḥammad had conceived of Islam as universal or not.

The opinion of al-T̲h̲awrÄ« appears to have been adopted by al-Ḏj̲Äḥiẓ. The heterodox movement of the Aḥmadiyya [q.v.], beginning towards the end of the 19th century, would go further than al-¶ T̲h̲awrÄ« inasmuch as it refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the d̲j̲ihÄd even as a recommended activity. Cf., in the same sense, the doctrine of BÄbism (see bÄb ).

According to the general doctrine of the S̲h̲īʿa, due account taken of their dogma concerning “the absence of the ImÄmâ€, who alone has the necessary competence to order war, the practice of the d̲j̲ihÄd is necessarily suspended until the re-appearance of the ImÄm or the ad hoc appointment of a vicar designated by him for this task. The ZaydÄ« sect, however, which does not recognize this dogma, follows the same teaching as that of the SunnÄ« doctrine.

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Characteristics of the duty of d̲j̲ihÄd.

The d̲j̲ihÄd is not an end in itself but a means which, in itself, is an evil ( fasÄd ), but which becomes legitimate and necessary by reason of the objective towards which it is directed: to rid the world of a greater evil; it is “good†from the fact that its purpose is “good†( ḥasan li-ḥusn g̲h̲ayrih).

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A religious duty.

The d̲j̲ihÄd has the effect of extending the sway of the faith; it is prescribed by God and his Prophet; the Muslim dedicates himself to the d̲j̲ihÄd in the same way that, in Christianity, the monk dedicates himself to the service of God; in the same vein it is said in different ḥadÄ«t̲h̲ s that “the d̲j̲ihÄd is the monasticism of Islamâ€; the d̲j̲ihÄd is “an act of pure devotionâ€; it is “one of the gates to Paradiseâ€; rich heavenly rewards are guaranteed for those who devote themselves to it; those who fall in the d̲j̲ihÄd are the martyrs of the faith, etc. A substantial part of the doctrine reckons the d̲j̲ihÄd among the very “pillars†(arkan) of the religion, along with prayer and fasting etc. It is a duty which falls upon every Muslim who is male, free and able-bodied. It is generally considered that non-Muslims may be called upon to assist the Muslims in the d̲j̲ihÄd.

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A “collective†obligation ( farḠkifÄya) in contrast to farḠʿayn .

The farḠkifÄya is that duty which is imposed upon the community considered as a whole and which only becomes obligatory for each individual in particular to the extent that his intervention is necessary for the realization of the purpose envisaged by the law. Thus, as soon as there exists a group of Muslims whose number is sufficient to fulfil the needs of a particular conflict, the obligation of the d̲j̲ihÄd no longer rests on the others. The general teaching is that the duty of d̲j̲ihÄd falls, in the first place, individually as a farḠʿayn , upon those who live in the territory nearest to the enemy, and that the same holds good in the case of the inhabitants of a town which is besieged. In the organized State, however, the appreciation of the precise moment at which the d̲j̲ihÄd is transformed into an Ê¿ayn obligation is a matter for the discretion of the sovereign; so that, in the case of general mobilization, the d̲j̲ihÄd loses, for all the members of the community, its character of farḠkifÄya, and becomes, instead, farḠʿayn .

All this implies, however, that for those who hold the reins of authority and, in particular, the sovereign, the d̲j̲ihÄd is always an individual duty, since their own personal action is necessary in every case. Where there are several independent Muslim states, the duty will fall upon the ruler of the state which is nearest to the enemy.

Further, the duty of the d̲j̲ihÄd is relative and contingent in this dual sense that, on the one hand, it only comes into being when their circumstances are favourable and of such a nature as to offer some hope¶ of a victorious outcome, and, on the other hand, the fulfillment of the duty may be renounced in consideration of the payment by the enemy of goods reaching a certain value, if such policy appears to be in conformity with the interests of the moment.

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Its subsidiary character.

Since the d̲j̲ihÄd is nothing more than a means to effect conversion to Islam or submission to its authority, there is only occasion to undertake it in circumstances where the people against whom it is directed have first been invited to join Islam. Discussion turned on the question as to whether it was necessary, on this ground, to address a formal invitation to the enemy. The general doctrine holds that since Islam is sufficiently widespread in the world, all peoples are presumed to know that they have been invited to join it. It is observed, however, that it would be desirable to repeat the invitation, except in cases where there is ground for apprehension that the enemy, thus forewarned, would profit from such a delay by better organizing his defences and, in this way, compromising the successful outcome of the d̲j̲ihÄd.

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Its perpetual character.

The duty of the d̲j̲ihÄd exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. “Until the day of the resurrectionâ€, and “until the end of the world†say the maxims. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily. Furthermore there can be no question of genuine peace treaties with these nations; only truces, whose duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorized. But even such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conflict. It is, however, recognized that such repudiation should be brought to the notice of the infidel party, and that he should be afforded sufficient opportunity to be able to disseminate the news of it throughout the whole of his territory [see á¹£ulḥ ].

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Its defensive as well as offensive character.

The d̲j̲ihÄd has principally an offensive character; but it is equally a d̲j̲ihÄd when it is a case of defending Islam against aggression. This indeed, is the essential purpose of the ribÄá¹­ [q.v.] undertaken by isolated groups or individuals settled on the frontiers of Islam. The ribÄá¹­ is a particularly meritorious act.

Finally, there is at the present time a thesis, of a wholly apologetic character, according to which Islam relies for its expansion exclusively upon persuasion and other peaceful means, and the d̲j̲ihÄd is only authorized in cases of “self defence†and of “support owed to a defenceless ally or brotherâ€. Disregarding entirely the previous doctrine and historical tradition, as well as the texts of the ḲurʾÄn and the sunna on the basis of which it was formulated, but claiming, even so, to remain within the bounds of strict orthodoxy, this thesis takes into account only those early texts which state the contrary (v. supra).

(E. Tyan)

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Bibliography

DÄmÄd Ef., Mad̲j̲maÊ¿ al-anhur, ed. Aḥmad b. Ê¿Ut̲h̲mÄn, 1328/1910, i, 636 ff.

DardÄ«r, al-S̲h̲arḥ al-á¹£ag̲h̲īr , with the gloss of á¹¢ÄwÄ«, i, 398 ff.

Ḏj̲Äḥiẓ, RasÄʾil, ed. SandÅ«bÄ«, Cairo 1933, 57

FarrÄʾ, AḥkÄm sulá¹­Äniyya , Cairo, 25 ff.

Goldziher, Schīʿitisches, in ZDMG , lxiv, 531 ff.

Addison, The Ahmadiya movement , in Harvard Theological Review, xxii, 1 ff.

Ibn Ê¿AbidÄ«n,¶ Radd al-muḥtÄr, Istanbul 1314/1905, iii, 315 ff.

Ibn Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmÄn, Raḥmat al-umma fÄ« 'k̲h̲tflÄf al-aʾimma, Cairo, 294

Ibn Ḏj̲umÄÊ¿a, TaḥrÄ«r al-aḥkÄm , ed. Kofler, (in Islamica, 1934), 349 ff.

Ibn ḲudÄma, Mug̲h̲nÄ«, 3rd. ed. Ras̲h̲īd Riá¸Ä, Cairo 1367/1947, viii, 345 ff.

Ibn Taymiyya, al-SiyÄsa al-s̲h̲arÊ¿iyya, Cairo 1322/1904, 156 ff.

MarÄg̲h̲ī, al-Tas̲h̲rÄ«Ê¿ al-islÄmÄ«, Cairo, 24 ff.

MÄwardÄ«, Aḥkam sulá¹­Äniyya , Cairo, 30 ff.

Querry, Recueil de lois concernant les musulmans chiites, Paris 1871, i, 321

Ras̲h̲id Riá¸Ä, Ḵh̲ilÄfa , Cairo 1341/1922, 29, 51

Sarak̲h̲sī, Mabsūṭ, Cairo, x, 35

ShÄfiÊ¿Ä«, KitÄb al-umm, Cairo 1903, with the MuzanÄ« gloss, v, 180 ff.

Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Mahomet, Paris 1957, 578 ff.

Draz, Le droit international publié et l'Islam , in Revue égyptienne de droit international public, 1949, 17 ff.

Haneberg, Das muslimische Kriegsrecht (Abh. der kgl. Bayer. Akad. der Wissensch., 1870, philos.-philol. cl., xii. Bd., II. Abt.), 219 ff., Juynboll, Handbuch 57, 335 ff.

Milliot, Introd. à l'étude du droit musulman, Paris 1953, 22, 34

á¹¢aÊ¿Ä«dÄ«, al-SiyÄsa al-islÄmiyya, Cairo

Sanhoury, Le Califat, thesis, Lyon 1925, 146

Strothmann, Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen, Strasbourg 1922, 42 ff.

Muh. S̲h̲adÄ«d, al-Ḏj̲ihÄd fi 'l-IslÄm, 1960

İA, art. Cihâd (Halim Sabit Şibay).

[Print Version: Volume II, page 538, column 1]

Citation:

Tyan, E. "ḎJ̲ihÄd." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman , Th. Bianquis , C.E. Bosworth , E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2009. Brill Online. York University. 29 January 2009

The struggle seems meaningful enough to me.

Edited January 30, 2009 by Guest

[SaggyBalls]

It might be important to truly understand is the translation of 'submission', 'domination', and 'authority' in this case. The verbiage seems intensely harsh, and although there is a nasty violent side to Islam there's also a mystical side that does not support violent means.

"The d̲j̲ihÄd is not an end in itself but a means which, in itself, is an evil ( fasÄd ), but which becomes legitimate and necessary by reason of the objective towards which it is directed: to rid the world of a greater evil; it is “good†from the fact that its purpose is “good†( ḥasan li-ḥusn g̲h̲ayrih)."

So 2 wrongs actually do make a right?

The writers of the encyclopedia don't all seem to have muslim names...converts?

In the end the struggle will be meaningless.

[Thorgnor]

anthropologists, linguists, sociologists, political scientists, religious scholars, etc.

[M.O.B.E]

In the end the struggle will be meaningless.

Banish the word struggle

From your attitude

and vocabulary.

All that we do now

must be done in a sacred manner and in celebration.

We are the ones

we’ve been waiting for.

-Hopi Elders

[Thorgnor]

nice...

On a related note...

U.N. Address by Thomas Banyacya.

[M.O.B.E]

Here is the whole message for those that havnt seen it.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOPI ELDERS

You have been telling

the people that this is

the Eleventh Hour.

Now you must go back

and tell the people that

this is the Hour.

And there are things

to be considered:

Where are you living?

What are you doing?

What are your relationships?

Are you in right relation?

Where is your water?

Know your garden.

It is time to speak your Truth.

Create your community.

Be good to each other.

And do not look outside yourself for the leader.

This could be a good time!

There is a river flowing now

very fast.

It is so great and swift

that there are those

who will be afraid.

They will try to hold

onto the shore.

They will feel they are being

torn apart and they will

suffer greatly.

Know the river has

its destination.

The elders say we must

let go of the shore,

Push off into the middle

of the river,

Keep our eyes open and

our heads above the water.

See who is in there with you

and celebrate.

At this time in history, we are

to take nothing personally.

Least of all, ourselves.

For the moment that we do,

Our spiritual growth

and journey come to a halt.

The time of the world is over.

Gather yourselves!

Banish the word struggle

From your attitude

and vocabulary.

All that we do now

must be done in a sacred manner and in celebration.

We are the ones

we’ve been waiting for.

[SaggyBalls]

"anthropologists, linguists, sociologists, political scientists, religious scholars, etc."

Aah that makes sense. The foul hand of credibility giving rise to divide once again.

[Thorgnor]

only you know the real truth

[SaggyBalls]

No truer words have ever been said.

[phishtaper]